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have been brought into the communist world, it does not appear that
a foreign connection will make communism less attractive to American
radicals. The danger does not lie in the free choice of communism
by the American people, but rather in its adoption through deceit, or
its imposition by physical force. Manifestly it is necessary to give
"increased drawing-power to our great traditions of democracy and
freedom," 21 but this is not enough to insure the survival of these
traditions.
Professor Chafee has emphasized that intemperance in the admin-
istration of laws directed against communist suspects has resulted in
hardships upon innocent persons. But it is questionable whether this
intemperance is more destructive of the common good than the liberal-
ity of those who would risk the transformation of some of our insti-
tutions into weapons for the destruction of constitutional freedom. It
is doubtful whether prior crises of liberty in American history in the
fields of religion, politics, economics, philosophy or sociology, apart
from crime itself, afford true analogies with regard to communism.
BRENDAN F. BROWN.*
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY LAW. By Everett C. McKeage. New
York: Vantage Press, 1956. Pp. 107. $5.00.
.This book is by Everett C. McKeage, who has served as Chief
Counsel of the California Public Utilities Commission for seventeen
years, -after an outstanding career at the bar and on the. bench of that
state. It brings together addresses on public utility regulatory law
delivered -by him. The addresses, when first published, attracted wide
and favorable notice. Their publication in book form will be welcomed
by administrators and practitioners.,
The scope of the addresses is broad. In one-hundred and seven
pages the author considers comprehensively the place and functions
of regulatory commissions; Section 13 of the Interstate Commerce
Act, its genesis and present impact upon state authority; the valuation
of public utility property; the due process concept under administra-
tive law; state regulation of air.carriers; the repudiation of the-rule
in the Ben Avon ' case; and utility regulation in California.
21 P. 62.
* Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
1 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (i920).
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The underlying philosophy of the author is that public utilities
are public trustees because they are grantees of special privileges,
including the right of condemnation, and render services affected with
a public interest which, except for such grant, government would
itself provide.
The author is of the Jefferson-Madison school. On the conilicts
in federal and state jurisdiction he closes the first chapter with the
warning in the celebrated statement of John P. Curran:
I assert that "Eternal vigilance is the condition upon which the Federal
Constitution has permitted the several States Ltheir, liberty of action in the
intrastate field." This assertion may not be, in a techhical sense, an exact
statement of the law, because the Federal Constitution did not grant anything
to the States which they did not then possess but, as a practical matter, I
contend that my assertion is painfully correct.2
Space limits comment to two-of the chapters. It is hoped that it
is enough, however, to whet the appetite. The chapter on Section 13
of the Interstate Commerce Act serves to point up Mr. Curran's
warning. This section makes unlawful rates for intrastate transporta-
tion prescribed by a state when found by the Interstate Commerce
Commission to discriminate unduly against interstate or foreign com-
merce, and vests the Commission with power to fix a minimum and
maximum superseding rate.
The chapter traces developments under Section 13 through the
decisions of the Commission and the courts. The analysis is keen;
the comment sometimes sharp, but fair. The author never has out of
mind the warning with which he closed the first chapter.
Current events fully justify the warning. In a case now pend-
ing, the complaining railroad company contends that Section 13 of
the Interstate Commerce Act extends to the order of a state com-
mission denying permission to discontinue the operation of an
intrastate passenger train, and that on a finding by the Interstate
Commerce Commission that such order burdens interstate commerce
the commission is vested with the power to nullify the requirement
that the operation of the train be continued.
In the chapter in which the author considers the valuation of
public utility property for rate-fixing, the author traces through the
decisions the shift in the position of the United States Supreme Court
on this subject. He pictures the long contest which culminated in
the overcoming of the "fair value at the time of the inquiry" rule by
the "prudent investment" rule-the substituting for the rule that the
Constitution requires that the utility be afforded opportunity to earn
a fair return on the fair value of the property devoted to public use
at the time of the inquiry, of the rule that constitutional requirements
are met when opportunity to earn a fair return on the prudent in-
2 P. 50.
19571]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
vestment in the property is afforded. While this struggle is no longer
at crest, it continues in various forms before commissions and courts.
The author is of the Brandeis-Holmes school, a stout defender
of "prudent investment." The lack of any detailed consideration of
what constitutes a "fair return" is a matter of regret. So, too, is the
want of consideration of the "cost of money" in determining a fair
rate of return. The author's views would be of interest and of value.
It is to be hoped that at some later day he will add to the debt owing
him by administrators and practitioners by setting forth his views on
these subjects.
FRANK H. SOMMER.*
CONTRACTS To MAKE WILLS. By Bertel M. Sparks. New York:
New York University Press, 1956. Pp. 230. $5.00.
This is a treatise on the legal relations arising-out of contracts
to devise or bequeath. The author has adequately stated these rela-
tions. In addition, he has underlined some of the confusion in this
area originating in a failure to differentiate the legal incidents of a
contract and those of a will. It is elementary that a contract, once
made, creates mutual rights and obligations and cannot be revoked by
the unilateral action of either party thereto. On the other hand, it is
likewise elementary that a duly executed will does not create a legal
interest in any of the beneficiaries named therein, and it may -be re-
voked by the testator at any time. A testator is generally acknowl-
edged to possess this power to revoke his will, even though such will
-was drawn in accordance with a contract theretofore made by him.
It has been stated in some leading judicial opinions that a con-
tract to devise or bequeath may be revoked upon notice given by one
party to the other, but that such a contract cannot be revoked after
the death of either party thereto, apparently on the theory of estoppel.
.Ifthe-courts making these observations had the contract to devise or
bequeath exclusively in mind, they are obviously inaccurate. A con-
tract to devise or bequeath, like any other contract, cannot be revoked
upon notice given by one party to the other; like other contracts, it
can be terminated only upon the consent of both parties thereto.
Furthermore, a contract of this kind is enforceable to, some extent
during the lifetime of both parties thereto, and upon the death of
•Deputy Attorney General, assigned to New Jersey Department of Public
Utilities, Board of Public Utility Commissioners; Dean Emeritus of New York
University School of Law.
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